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For any regime change, the question of whether or not to transition to democracy is a startling one that requires a close examination of the conditions in a particular country. In other words, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for transitioning to democracy. While geography, diversity, population size, economics, and hundreds of other factors play a role in the long-term stability of democracy, the outgoing regime tends to hold the most relevant information. Over two-thirds of countries that have transitioned to democracy since World War II have done so under constitutions written by the outgoing authoritarian regime, including Argentina, Chile, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and South Korea (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). Typically, the implementation of democracy requires the removal of the prior regime and a complete reconstruction of basic institutions. However, the new democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing regime which seeks to safeguard incumbent elites and give them a leg up in political and economic competition after democratization. Therefore, a successful plan to transition must be mindful of the existing structure and seek to remedy the problems directly caused by that structure.
A federation is a constitutionally organized union of partially self-governing states or other regions under a central (federal) government. Unlike the largely powerless local governments in a unitary state, the states of a federation enjoy some degree of independence in their internal affairs. Federalism is a potentially important institutional variable for democratic transitions and consolidation because it introduces an additional element of ‘organized uncertainty’ into the democratic process not found in unitary systems. Federalism typically over-represents certain subnational units, giving them influence in national politics. Over-representation can shape politicians’ strategies for national coalition-building and tends to affect the distribution of resources. Given this, federalism could affect the path of a country’s transition, or even, in a crisis, affect a country’s ability to consolidate democratic institutions (Samuels & Abrucio, 2000). In a federal system, the national government normally has little to no authority to alter the boundaries or legal responsibilities of local governments but the state or provincial government in which the localities reside may possess such authority. Many societies that transition to democracy struggle to develop political cultures that support opposition and foster political competition. Federalism bolsters such competition if certain legal parameters and political circumstances are met. Federa; regimes allow political parties in opposition with real opportunities to develop policy and character-based track records that will eventually garner support from voters on either side of the debate. Political competition is inextricably linked with democratic stability, and without it, democracy may falter into authoritarianism (Marshfield, 2011). In established democracies, voters tend to have the benefit of access to a candidates track record , or their political and educational history. This allows voters to evaluate a candidates potential for office success, and two-party or multi-party political systems foster political competition for voter support. However, emerging democracies face significant obstacles to political opposition. Samuel Huntington writes, In any society, the sustained failure of the major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises questions concerning the degree of competition permitted by the system (1991). Social, economic, and political demands from the citizenry along with an often tumultuous transition can create strong incentives for the first elected party to consolidate power and eliminate any political opposition. Therefore, a federal system is preferable for emerging democracies than unitary systems.
Electoral systems are the legal and formal institutions that translate votes into political control and are vital to the foundation of stable democracies. In many cases, the type of electoral system a developing democracy chooses is often intertwined with the development of a countrys party system. Prominent political parties, which anticipate their strengths and those of their rivals, often have a hand in shaping the rules in an emerging democracy. Therefore, the choice of the electoral system in most transitional countries has been made based on what is familiar or convenient and not based on what system is most likely to sustain the democratic process (Barkan, Densham, & Rushton, 2006). In the electoral system of proportional representation, representatives are chosen in large electoral districts (or at the national level) with multiple representatives from each district. Therefore, the national legislature is divided on a proportional basis, or multiple representatives for large districts are allocated proportionally according to the number of votes in each district (Orvis & Drogus, 2018). Proportional representation is more likely to support multi-party systems, coalition governments, and more equal executive-legislative power dynamics than plurality systems (ONeil & Rogowski, 2018). Unlike plurality systems, proportional representation facilitates the representation of minorities. In countries where ethnic and/or religious minorities have formed political parties, proportional representation has allowed them a universal increase in representation within the legislature (ONeil & Rogowski, 2018). The proposition that proportional representation weakens rather than strengthens democracy rests on the analysis of the differences between multi-party and majority-party situations. If it is true that multi-party systems sharpen differences and reduce consensus, then any electoral system that increases the chance for more rather than fewer parties serves democracy badly. The system of electing members of parliament to represent territorial constituencies, as contrasted with systems that encourage direct group representation (such as proportional representation), is preferable since territorial representation helps to stabilize the political systems by forcing interest groups to secure their ends only within an electoral framework that involves some concern with many interests and the need for compromise (Lipset, 1959).
Those institutions that are adopted during the transition to democracy can affect success and stability in the future. One crucial variable in determining the success of emerging democracies is determining the methods of selecting (and potentially removing) the head of government. Presidentialists regard the direct popular election of the head of state as an asset to democracy, while parliamentarians feel that the concentration of power into a single office is not ideal for democracy (ONeil & Rogowski, 2018). To the extent that the institutions of economics, politics, and social development influence the quality of governance, parliamentary systems may offer certain advantages over presidential systems (Gerring, Thacker & Moreno, 2007). A parliamentary regime is one in which the only democratically legitimate institution is the parliament; the government’s authority is dependent upon confidence in the parliaments capabilities to govern effectively (Linz, 1990). Although the growing personalization of party leadership in some parliamentary regimes has made prime ministers seem more and more like presidents, it remains true that barring the dissolution of parliament and a call for new elections, premiers cannot appeal directly to the people over the heads of their representatives. Parliamentary systems may include presidents who are elected by direct popular vote, but they cannot usually compete seriously for power with the prime minister. Juan Linz (1990) writes:
The vast majority of the stable democracies in the world today are parliamentary regimes, where executive power is generated by legislative majorities and depends on such majorities for survival…By contrast, the only presidential democracy with a long history of constitutional continuity is the United States.
Many political scholars have come to the consensus that it is not a strong leader that makes a successful democracy, but a steady one. Abrupt changes in government result in polarizing parties that base their platforms on repealing a vast majority of the former ruling partys policies (ONeil & Rogowski, 2018). Instead of constant political party turnover, parliamentarism promotes coalition governments which in turn promotes stability and continuity.
Overall, the most stable and beneficial mixture of electoral and political institutions is the proportional representation electoral system and the parliamentary system. This combination is more capable of resolving ethnic differences caused by population diversity (an increasingly relevant topic in the modern era of transportation) than its presidential-plurality system counterpart and is more advantaged than presidential-plurality systems in economic considerations as well. However, parliamentary-proportional systems are disadvantaged in that they do not allow for quick decision-making. While presidential-plurality systems convey a message of strong government and promote single-party cabinets that allow for speedy decision-making, it is often more desirable for policies to be supported by broad consensus.
References
- Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V. (2018, May 8). Why Are So Many Democracies Breaking Down? Retrieved December 1, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/democracy-authoritarian-constitutions.html?auth=link-dismiss-google1tap.
- Barkan, J., Densham, P., & Rushton, G. (2006). Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 926-939. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/4122924
- Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno. (2007). Are Federal Systems Better than Unitary Systems? Boston University.
- Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1113.
- Linz, Juan J. (1990). The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1990, pp. 51-69.
- Lipset, S. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105. doi:10.2307/1951731
- ONeil, P. H., & Rogowski, R. (2018). Essential Readings in Comparative Politics (5th ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Orvis, S. & Drogus, C. (2018). Introducing Comparative Politics: The Essentials. Thousand Oaks, California: CQ Press.
- Roser, M. (2019) . Democracy. Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: ‘https://ourworldindata.org/democracy’ [Online Resource].
- Samuels, D., & Abrucio, F.L. (Spring 2000). Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The ‘New’ Politics of the Governors in Brazil. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 30:2.
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