The Incident With Wolterman: The First Line-Of-Duty Death in the History of Hfd

Table of Contents

Introduction
Overview of the Firefighter
Incident Overview
References

Introduction

The City of Hamilton, Ohio, is not marked by any significant historical events. It is not a very large city, occupying only about 22 square miles. The City of Hamilton is inhabited by 63,000 citizens, served by the Hamilton Fire Department (Hamilton Fire Department [HFD] 2019). HFD provides 24/7 fire services and emergency medical services, and its duty is to respond to incidents ranging from fire and hazardous material emergencies to river rescue operations and transport accidents. In 2015, the department employed 96 career firefighters and paramedics working on a three 24/48-hour shift system (HFD 2019). HFD apparatus includes four engines, one quint, one tower ladder, three medic units (Life Squads), and one battalion chief command vehicle (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health [NIOSH] 2017, 1). HFD has five stations, each having its response area and assigned to an engine (HFD 2019). Annual calls for service exceed 10,000, and most of the incidents require emergency medical service response (NIOSH 2017). The candidates for career firefighters undergo a thorough background investigation and are well-trained.

Notably, prior to 2015, the department was larger than at the time of the incident. HFD had seven frontline units instead of five, and its minimum daily staffing was 28 firefighters instead of 22 (NIOSH 2017). The incident with Wolterman appeared to be the first line-of-duty death in the history of HFD since 1971 (Baker 2015). Overall, there were eleven such incidents over the period of HFD operation (Butts 2015). Woltermans line-of-duty death is the most recent of them, having occurred in 2015.

Overview of the Firefighter

Patrick Robert Wolterman was born on January 22, 1987, in the state of Ohio. In 2005, he graduated from Roger Bacon High School and later, in 2011, obtained an Associates Degree in Fire Service from the University of Cincinnati (Journal-News 2015). Little is known about his family life; it is reported that he had a sister and a brother and married Bre Wolterman in May 2015, about half a year before his demise (Journal-News 2015). He was only 28 years old when he died on December 28, 2015, having fallen through the floor of a burning house.

Wolterman was hired for the position of a firefighter in HFD in April 2015. Prior to that, he worked as a part-time firefighter in Colerain Fire Department (2008-2015) and Fairfield Township Fire Department (2014-2015), so his working experience was over six years (Journal-News 2015). Woltermans training history and obtained certificates were extensive and included NFPA 1001, Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter I and Fire Fighter II, which are essential for any firefighter (NIOSH 2017, 3). Apart from that, he was qualified as a Swiftwater Rescue Technician and a Fire Apparatus Operator and completed various other training programs (NIOSH 2017). Wolterman had 682 hours of company-level training while working in the previous departments (NIOSH 2017, 3). Thus, the firefighter had extensive training and working experience.

Woltermans station life did not differ from that of other firefighters in the department. He was stationed at Fire Station 25 on North Erie Boulevard and wore badge 89 (Baker 2015). His unit was called Quint 25, and his crew on the day of the incident included the acting officer with 20 years of fire service experience and a fire apparatus operator (NIOSH 2017). Although an engine was supposed to be staffed with four crew members, HRD assigned a minimum of three members due to vacations and Kelly days.

Incident Overview

The incident happened on December 28, 2015, at a residential structure at 1310 Pater Avenue in Hamilton, Ohio (see Appendix A). At 0113 hours, HRD was informed that there was a black smoke showing at this house, and it was reported that two elderly people might have been inside (NIOSH 2017). Waltermans unit, Quint 25, responded and reached the scene at 0117 hours, after which the acting officer evaluated the structure. The acting officer decided to enter the house through the front door, and the firefighter, Walterman, forced the door and entered the house. Walterman crawled to the right into the living room, with the acting officer behind him on the hose line (see Appendix B). As soon as the firefighter entered the living room, the floor collapsed, causing Walterman to fall into the basement. A Mayday was called in 0123 hours, and at about 0135 hours, the fallen firefighter was located and moved outside, where he was treated by six paramedics (NIOSH 2017). Then, he was transported to the local hospital, where, at 0226 hours, he was pronounced dead.

As a result of the firefighter fatality, specific changes were made to HFD. Particularly, much attention was given to training firefighters to use consistent size-up processes and communication models (HFD 2019). Apart from improved training, HFD enhanced communications among dispatchers and units by establishing new operational policies. For example, now firefighters should report that they are responding to a call not while they are at the station, but while they are in their trucks (HFD 2019). HFD has also begun to pay more attention to live fire training drills to ensure that firefighters are capable of performing their duties.

NIOSH made a set of recommendations to prevent such incidents from happening again. The top five recommendations included (1) ensuring a detailed risk evaluation and scene size-up; (2) matching the incident action plan with the conditions encountered on the scene; (3) developing strategies for wind-driven fires; (4) implementing standard operating procedure; (5) improving training programs (NIOSH 2017). As seen from the changes made by HFD, they have already followed some of the NIOSH recommendations.